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T his essay suggests that there is a body of Latin American 
structuralist economic theory which possesses distinctive characteristics 
while having a family resemblance to other institutionalist schools of 
thought, and which is based on an original approach to economic value. 
The founders of structuralism conceived a systemic, multidimensional and 
dynamic approach. They applied it to the study of improvements in, and the 
social distribution of, labour productivity generated in the central economies 
and the effects of these on the societies of the periphery. This outlook 
challenges the notion of markets as self-regulating systems that return 
to stable equilibrium positions, presenting them rather as a quantitative 
expression of the national or international power status of contracting 
parties. Different development styles and processes progressively alter the 
power structure of social systems and these changes are reflected in the 
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At the heart of  any economic theory about the 
capitalist system is the study of economic values, the 
market and prices. These are the leitmotiv and central 
focus of  this essay. The broader context for these 
reflections is the process of structural change that has 
developed in capitalist societies as a consequence of 
the successive technological revolutions which have 
expanded the productive power of  human labour. 
Accordingly, the analysis carried out here does not 
deal with market prices under conditions of stable 
equilibrium, but with the changes in the structure of 
markets and prices that accompany development. 
This essay offers a reading of some pioneers of Latin 
American structuralist economics, and we believe that 
their key writings contain a theory of economic value, 
the market and prices that is radically different from 
the one established in academia.
Unlike static theories, which tend to isolate and 
“compartmentalize” the activities of the market in 
the formation of the price system, Latin American 
structuralist economics sets out from a systemic,1 
multidimensional and historically dynamic view of 
human societies.
To begin with, two basic limitations of this study 
need to be clarified.
First, it does not examine the institutional thinking 
of the Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (eclac). To avoid misunderstandings, 
this essay will distinguish between the idea of political 
economy and that of economic theory. We conceive 
of  political economy as a discipline intended to 
support the legislator and statesman (Smith, 2007, p. 
275), while economic theory includes, first, a value-
rich underlying approach and, second, the theory as 
such. It is a system of hypotheses about the behaviour 
of reality that can be verified with the help of the 
scientific method.2
This notion of political economy (which differs 
from that of the other classical economists and Marx, 
who make it a synonym for economic science) is very 
well suited to showing the kind of tasks that have to be 
performed by an intergovernmental body like eclac. 
For example, in his studies on the evolution of the 
institution’s thinking, Bielschowsky (1998 and 2009) 
refers to the action strategies and key ideas proposed 
to Latin American governments. According to Adam 
Smith’s characterization, this belongs to the realm of 
political economy and only tacitly or tangentially to 
structuralist economic theory.
Secondly, and for the same reasons, this paper 
does not analyse neo-structuralist thinking about 
economic values, markets and prices. As Bielschowsky 
(2009) observes in relation to the structuralist period 
of eclac thinking, “the texts published in the first 30 
years studied in this article were mostly authored by 
the leading eclac intellectuals of that period, while 
those chosen to represent the institution’s thinking 
over the three most recent decades tend to be its 
official documents” (Bielschowsky, 2009, p. 172). 
These documents reveal an outlook heavily influenced 
by the political demands of member governments.3 
Examining the personal theoretical contributions of 
the neo-structuralist authors is not an impossible task, 
but it is beyond the scope of the writer of this essay.
I
Latin American structuralism:
economic theory and political economy
2 This essay will not examine the theoretical and epistemological 
links between Latin American structuralism and other institutionalist 
schools of thought. Osvaldo Sunkel (1989) is essential reading for 
those interested in comparing Latin American structuralism with 
United States institutionalism. See also Mallorquín (2006).
3 Thus, Bielschowsky goes on to say: “The neo-structuralist formulation 
made it possible to build bridges with those Latin American and 
Caribbean governments that had persevered with the reforms [a 
reference to “the liberalization guided by the Washington Consensus”], 
without abandoning the original structuralist analytical edifice, 
  The opinions expressed in this paper are the exclusive responsibility 
of the author and commit no other person or institution.
1 Following the Argentinean philosopher Mario Bunge, we 
understand by system any complex thing whose parts are bonded 
by various stable ties constituting its structure. A concrete system 
(as opposed to a theoretical system) exists objectively and has a 
physical basis, so that the central feature of any system of this 
kind is that it is in a permanent process of change. A given human 
society can be envisaged as an intrinsically dynamic concrete social 
system composed of individuals (or associations and organizations 
formed of individuals), with the ties that constitute its structure 
being the technical and social rules actually operating there (Bunge, 
1998, p. 310-311).
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Of the two great schools of economic thought in the 
twentieth century, one followed the marginalist and 
the other the Marxist-Ricardian theory of economic 
value. Against both of  them and their orthodox 
and influential proponents arose a heterodoxy that 
would include many scientists from the United States 
institutionalist school and others imbued with the ideas 
of the Keynesian revolution. In the post-war period, 
decolonization and European reconstruction led to 
concern about development and underdevelopment. 
From different standpoints, all these currents of 
thought challenged academically established theories 
of  economic value. Structuralist economic theory 
formed part of that heterodoxy.
while insisting on the urgent need to implement policies for radical 
social and economic change to overcome underdevelopment, going 
beyond the functioning of the free market. For some, this meant 
surrendering to neoliberalism, but for others it was an alternative 
that would make it possible to continue influencing the region’s 
destinies from eclac’s traditional theoretical and methodological 
perspective. A reading of the key texts published in the decades of 
1990 and 2000 strengthen the latter interpretation” (Bielschowsky, 
2009, p. 177).
II
Structuralist economic theory between two fires
The market and price theory of Latin American 
structuralism has been challenged from two sides. These 
challenges have come, on the one hand, from Marxist 
theorists and, on the other, from neoclassical marginalists 
arguing from the paradigm of perfect competition or, 
more broadly, from the static logic of marginal calculus 
applied to “free” markets. For Marxists, market prices are 
an expression of social labour embodied in the products 
traded (see box 1), while for neoclassical economists 
they are a manifestation of marginal utility and the 
scarcity of goods (see box 2). The approach taken by 
Latin American structuralism to economic value and 
the price formation process has never fitted neatly into 
either of these theoretical approaches.
III
A synthesis of structuralist market
and price theory
The theoretical view of prices and the market in the 
Latin American structuralist school, sometimes implicit 
and sometimes explicit, is that at any given time the 
existence of the market reflects the power positions 
of social actors in relation to the different spheres 
of each society. Consequently, market prices can be 
understood as a measure of power positions and of 
the specific strategies and tactics of contracting parties, 
while the variations they undergo over time reveal the 
changes progressively arising in this situation. This 
thesis does not deny that prices also measure utility 
and scarcity, or that they are connected to the work 
embodied in the goods traded, but what underlies 
these measurements is that, in the final analysis, the 
power positions and the strategies and tactics of 
contracting parties are still what determine prices. 
In the marketplace, power is calculated by units of 
purchasing power in general, i.e., monetary units 
divided by price indices. What is adopted here is the 
broadest conception of prices, encompassing those 
of production inputs, final goods and services and, 
above all, the primary factors of production, which 
constitute the remuneration for their owners. Also 
included, of  course, is the price of  money—both 
international exchange rates and interest rates set 
locally and internationally.4
4 Here we should recall the thinking of Polanyi (2001), who argues 
that natural resources, human labour and money cannot be included 
in an ordinary theory of markets since they are not by nature goods 
and are not produced as such. In this context, we might add that 
it is largely price formation for these basic factors that introduces 
the institutional conditions affecting the structure of the market 
and prices on the aggregate supply side. None of the prices for 
178
LATIn AmERICAn STRUCTURALISm AnD EConomIC ThEoRy  •  ARmAnDo DI fILIPPo
C E P A L  R E V I E W  9 8  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 9
Box 1
marx’s theory of value and its structural underpinnings
The view of the social process upheld by Marx (1967) is evidently historical, structural and multidimensional 
and includes a core analysis of property institutions (production relationships). His theory of economic 
value is one-dimensional, however. Under conditions of stable equilibrium, prices equate to value, which 
for Marx is a measure of the working time that is socially necessary given the average technical conditions 
in a particular period. His theory of value is not designed to record the effects of  major institutional 
changes directly, except when these affect average technical conditions. The stability of the equilibrium 
presupposed by this theory implicitly requires that all the factors (environmental, political and cultural) 
underlying this equilibrium be immobile. The theory of value adopted by Marx is a Ricardian transplant 
unconnected with the historical dialectic characterizing his overall view of society.
When Marx introduced his notion of production prices associated with the equalization of rates of 
profit in all markets (in volume III of Capital, published by Engels), he established the combination of a 
market-driven mechanism (intersectoral mobility of capital) and a valorization process that depends on 
the sphere of production. Since production prices are also abstractions, however, these are really values 
that, in Marx’s sense, should not properly be called prices since they are not calculated as monetary units 
paid in specific markets (Di Filippo, 1981a and 1981b).
Production prices as conceived by Marx come under a logic similar to the classical concept of natural 
prices, implying a stable equilibrium towards which markets tend. For Adam Smith (2007, chapter 7), this 
framework of stability largely depends on the general conditions of society, while for Marx it is based 
in a more limited way on average technical conditions. Furthermore, Adam Smith, like Robert Malthus, 
understands the value of goods as the amount of human labour required to buy them and not the labour 
embodied in their production. Consequently, the former takes direct account of social market relationships 
in the very formulation of his theory of value. The idea of effective demand, introduced by Adam Smith 
himself, continued by Malthus and elaborated in depth by Keynes, assumes the involvement of the market 
in setting the value of goods. The concept of  effective demand is the bridge whereby Latin American 
structuralism links the functional and personal distribution of income to the pricing of final goods.
Another fundamental difference between Marxism and Latin American structuralism lies in their 
philosophies of history. The starting point or ultimate cause of Marx’s historical approach is the economic 
structure. This is the basic underpinning of  the labour theory of  value, which is assumed to be valid 
only under the average technical conditions and production (property) relationships of a given historical 
period. Against this background, cultural and political aspects are seen as superstructural epiphenomena 
of this central fact.
For the Latin American structuralists, on the other hand, as for the institutionalists, the cultural 
system is the central fact. Technical progress, which is now the basis of capitalist societies, originated as 
a manifestation of cultural creativity, an issue that has been examined in some depth by Celso Furtado 
and will be returned to later on.
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of K. Marx, Capital, New York, International Publishers, 1967; A. Di 
Filippo, “Desarrollo y desigualdad social en la América Latina”, Lecturas, No. 44, Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 1981 and “La tesis del excedente y la realización de la plusvalía en Marx” (appendix citing authorship), 
Capitalismo periférico: crisis y transformación, R. Prebisch, Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1981; and A. 
Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Petersfield, Harriman House, 2007.
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Box 2
the epistemological foundations of neoclassical theories of value and growth
It is necessary to make the same distinction here as was touched upon at the beginning of this article 
between economic theory (and the preanalytical cognitive outlook associated with it) and political economy. 
The theoretical outlook of neoclassical economics gives a central place to the dogma of self-regulating 
markets, which means that neoclassical economic theory is based essentially on microeconomic logic 
and assumes a long-run macroeconomy and full employment, ignoring the issue of  effective demand. 
Neoclassical political economy as applied to globalized capitalism is what this essay will call neoliberalism, 
of which the criteria and principles of the Washington Consensus are an example. Consequently, not all 
the excesses of neoliberalism ought to be attributed to the neoclassical theoretical outlook.
It must be realized that political economy in the Smithian sense was meant for statesmen in a national 
economy, but the neoclassical political economy we here call “neoliberalism” was a specific strategy of 
transnational firms that tried (for a time successfully) to change the ground rules of the global economy 
(Washington Consensus) to favour their microeconomic policies. Lastly, as we shall see further on, some 
neoclassical economists use the term “new political economy” in a manner wholly incompatible with what 
this essay understands by political economy.
Marginal analysis, developed by Marshall for a partial equilibrium approach and by Walras for general 
equilibrium, was heavily based on mathematical formalization using differential and integral calculus. 
Thus, taking an epistemological approach and following the fathers of  classical mechanics of  the late 
eighteenth century, the early neoclassical economists sought to establish the natural laws of economics. 
Marginal analysis was a crucial instrument for the original neoclassical formulations relating to theories 
of consumption and production, to determine the stable equilibrium points of microeconomic markets 
and uphold their theories of functional income distribution based on equality of marginal productivity 
and factor remuneration. Personal income distribution and the concept of  the subsistence wage have 
always been excluded from core neoclassical economic theory.
Unlike the classical economists and Marx, whose basic economic categories were tied to historically 
identifiable actors (rentier landowners, wage workers, industrial entrepreneurs, etc.), neoclassical theory 
completely depersonalized economic categories and turned them into abstract, ahistorical variables.
Subsequently, however, and especially since the end of the Second World War, undeniable historical 
evidence has been brought to light in the most widely circulated neoclassical academic texts. Both game 
theory and existing studies of imperfect markets (monopoly, oligopoly, monopolistic competition) entailed 
a limited but explicit recognition of the power asymmetries affecting market prices. These theories and 
studies were incorporated into the reference works most commonly employed in Western academia.
Academic centres gradually consolidated a “conservative institutionalism” or “new neoclassical 
institutionalism” that was invariably based on defence of  the market and private property as basic 
microeconomic underpinnings of the social order (Von Hayek, Nozik and North, among others) but that 
abandoned or at least softened the concern with retaining the premises of welfare and perfect competition 
theory. The frictions arising in markets with imperfect information were recognized, with acceptance for 
example of externalities and transaction costs (Ronald Coase, Kenneth Arrow, Douglass North, Oliver 
Williamson, Stiglitz and others).
What is now known as “new neoclassical economics” is not political economy in the sense accepted 
by the present essay but is in fact an expanded and enhanced version of neoclassical economic theory as 
relating to the different forms of micro-rationality (rational choice) and its effects in the economic, political 
and cultural spheres. The only difference is that some members of this school have tried to “export” it 
to other social disciplines. For example, Olson (1965) considered the problem of the “free rider” and 
introduced the idea of targeted regulation, based on rewards or punishments, to confer social rationality 
on this behaviour. Becker (1964) tried to extend the principles of instrumental or strategic rationality to 
the sphere of interpersonal, family and amorous relationships, among other things.
The neoclassical economists also recognized and allowed for the role of the State in the sphere of 
regulation and the role of government in that of public policies (fiscal, monetary and so on) under the 
influence of the Keynesian revolution, but effective demand theory continued to be relegated to the short 
term and to the study of economic cycles.
By introducing an essentially logical or theoretical notion of  time, meanwhile, they defined the 
“long run” as the stage in economic growth processes where full employment and self-regulating markets 
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In 1956, as a first polemical response to the neo-Keynesian views of growth theory that had originated 
in Cambridge, United Kingdom, Solow prepared an alternative theoretical proposal based on the main 
premises of neoclassical theory: a static approach rooted in perfect competition, remuneration of primary 
factors in accordance with their marginal productivity, a tendency for the model to reach stable equilibrium 
positions, production functions based on factor substitution, etc. In particular, technical progress, absent 
from the original foundations of  neoclassical theory, was treated by Solow as an exogenous variable 
affecting overall productivity. For his purposes he used a macroeconomic production function of decreasing 
returns to each production factor and constant returns to scale for the whole group. In this way he was 
able to preserve the characteristic distribution theory of this school, which links factor remuneration to 
the relevant marginal productivity under conditions of perfect competition.
From the standpoint of price theory, neoclassical growth theory, in Solow’s version, simply ignores the 
problem. In his Prize Lecture after receiving the Nobel Prize for Economics, he observed: “The idea is to 
imagine that the economy is populated by a single immortal consumer, or a number of identical immortal 
consumers. (…) [S]he, or the dynasty, is supposed to solve an infinite-time utility-maximization problem. 
(…) [A]ny kind of market failure is ruled out from the beginning, by assumption. There are no strategic 
complementarities, no coordination failures, no prisoners’ dilemmas. (…) Inseparable from this habit of 
thought is the automatic presumption that observed paths are equilibrium paths. So we are asked to regard 
the construction I have just described as a model of the actual capitalist world” (Solow, 1988).
Once again, as in the post-war period, the historical evidence made this neoclassical theory of growth 
unsustainable, leading to the recognition of  new theoretical premises. Following on from the original 
neoclassical theory, what then began to gain ground was the idea of endogenous growth, led by Romer 
(1986 and 1990) and Lucas (1988).
Endogenous growth theory abandons the notion of constant returns to scale and accepts that of 
growing returns to scale for all production factors represented in the production function. Economies of 
scale were widely recognized in earlier economic thought; eclac, for example, had used the concept in 
the 1960s to advocate Latin American integration with a view to stimulating industrial development.
From this new perspective, Grossman and Helpman (1991) suggested that the unpatentable basic 
technological knowledge which was one of the general products of science manifested itself  on the one 
hand as a public good (technical standards or instructions are not exhausted by use but remain available 
for others) and on the other as a private good via research and development (R&D). This entails huge 
fixed costs that can only be recovered by operating on the scale of major transnational corporations in 
global markets.
Neoclassical theory was thus modified from its original Walrasian and Marshallian premises as 
a result of  three interdependent historical factors. First, there was the recognition of the asymmetries 
of  economic power that arise between firms interacting in “imperfect” markets (monopoly, oligopoly, 
monopolistic competition and the use of game theory). Second, there was the emergence of information 
and communication technologies (icts), which have provided the principal historical examples of increasing 
returns to scale in knowledge production under conditions of technological monopoly—one need only 
think of Microsoft and the successive versions of the Windows software. Third, there is the huge influence 
of lobbying by transnational corporations to institutionalize their positions of power by designing new 
ground rules for global capitalism (World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund), particularly 
since the so-called Washington Consensus.
Endogenous growth theory, expressed in the use of  production functions, has not yielded good 
empirical estimates. The alternatives explored, like adding, redefining or removing variables in aggregate 
production functions, have not been successful. For example, the data available have not borne out the 
specific prediction of relative or absolute convergence of living standards proposed, or assumed, in the 
early neoclassical approaches. Estimates are becoming ever more devoid of theory, while the “theories” 
are becoming increasingly disconnected from the information handled (Martin and Sunley, 1998).
Source: prepared by the author on the basis of M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 
Harvard University Press, 1965; G. Becker, Human Capital, New York, Columbia University Press, 1964; R. Solow, 
“Growth theory and after”, American Economic Review, vol. 78, No. 3, Nashville, Tennessee, American Economic 
Association, 1988; J. Katz, “Structural reforms, productivity and technological change in Latin America”, Libros de 
la cepal series, No. 64 (LC/G.2129-P), Santiago, Chile. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.01.II.G.22, 2001; 
P. Romer, “Endogenous technological change”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 98, No. 5, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1990, and “Increasing returns and long run growth”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 94, No. 5, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1986; and R. Lucas, “On the mechanics of economic development”, Journal of 
Monetary Economics, No. 22, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 1988.
Box 2 (concluded)
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In the more specifically distributive sphere, the 
structuralists consider three basic structural influences. 
First, they associate functional income distribution 
with the institutional and industrial power status of 
those who own the primary factors of  production 
(the notion of distribution surplus that we touch on 
later comes into play here), and secondly, they include 
personal or family income distribution, derived from 
the above, which directly affects the composition of 
aggregate demand for consumer goods and personal 
saving and investment behaviour.5 In the third place, 
they stress the role of the State as the “maker of official 
rules” and that of  the government (conceptually 
different from the State) as a strategic economic 
actor in advanced capitalist societies. In particular, 
the original distribution of  income is modified in 
the short term by the redistributive effects of fiscal 
policy (on both the tax and spending sides). In the 
long run, government actions affect the distribution 
of  fundamental public goods such as health care, 
education and justice.
Where values, markets and prices are concerned, 
the most distinctive theoretical feature of  Latin 
American structuralism is its multidimensional 
character. The power positions that directly or indirectly 
affect prices and the market are the places occupied 
by actors (individuals or groupings) in the economic, 
political, biologico-environmental and cultural 
structure of human societies. The economic structure 
determines the situation of individuals in production 
and ownership regimes, and the political structure 
determines the place occupied by actors (including 
the government itself) in the regimes that regulate 
citizens’ rights, freedoms and obligations, including 
access to the legislative, executive and judicial powers 
of the State. The biologico-environmental structure, 
meanwhile, establishes the situation of actors in the 
regimes that regulate access to the “natural biophysical 
environment and its successive artificial transformations, 
as likewise its spatial extent” (Sunkel, 1980), while 
the cultural structure determines the place occupied 
by actors in the regimes that regulate information, 
communication and knowledge systems. However, 
there are also informal structures that fix the type of 
symbols or codes used, starting with language, and 
the kind of values, be they substantive (ultimate goals 
such as truth, good, beauty and justice) or instrumental 
(utility, effectiveness, efficiency), that legitimize social 
behaviour and delimit the mechanisms whereby cultural 
stratifications are produced.
The power thus held by individuals and 
organizations is considered to be institutionalized 
or structured if  it is incorporated into the reciprocal 
expectations of normal conduct in social interactions, 
obviously including market transactions. These 
structural positions, which we have characterized 
schematically, set all kinds of limits to the exercise 
of  human freedom and ultimately determine both 
the quantity of labour and the utility and scarcity 
of the goods traded.6
The concept of institutionalized (or structured) 
power can be used to overcome or transcend the 
holism-individualism dilemma underlying many 
epistemological debates. According to the holistic 
outlook, human behaviour largely depends on social 
structures, while from an individualistic perspective 
it is actors or agents (natural or legal persons) who 
determine the dynamic of historical change by their 
decisions and behaviour. Considered from one side 
only, the first approach may lead to deterministic 
these strategic factors derives from a specific production process; 
they are generated rather by the structural conditions that sustain 
the power of actors, alterations to these or changes in the power 
tactics and strategies adopted. From the standpoint of demand, 
furthermore, there are also structural situations, strategies and 
tactics that determine the transition from functional distribution 
to family or personal distribution of income.
5 For those who like graphic representations, the position and 
slope of the demand curve in the chart of  coordinates for any 
consumption good will depend directly on the level of incomes 
and on their personal and family distribution. It is enough to 
know the consumption basket of each income stratum to make 
an approximate calculation of the number of people who will be 
able to afford a particular good as its price falls. When we examine 
movements along the demand curve as a consequence of shifts 
in the supply curve or function, we find that when the price of a 
particular good falls (downward shift in the supply curve), this good 
comes to form part of the composition of spending by the lower 
income strata and demand for it increases, whereas when prices 
rise for the good concerned (upward shift in the supply function), 
the opposite happens. Thus, from the demand perspective both 
the utility and the scarcity of goods depend on the purchasing 
power of those creating the demand for them. Seen in this graphic 
way, changes in personal income distribution entail a shift in the 
demand function. Lastly, the composition of aggregate demand as 
a whole largely depends on the level and distribution of personal 
and family income. In this case too, changes in the distribution 
entail an alteration in the composition of aggregate demand.
6 In the eclac tradition, the multidimensional idea of power and 
institutions derives substantially from the work of José Medina 
Echavarría (1963 and 1973). The so-called Latin American school 
of  development (Di Filippo, 2007), whose economic facet is 
expressed in Latin American structuralism, has its firmest basis 
in Medina’s studies.
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The concept of  creativity, understood as the use 
of human freedom to intervene in the usual order 
of human social processes and irreversibly recreate 
them, is at the root of the structuralist view of the 
economy and was developed in particular depth by 
Celso Furtado (1978).
Aristotle anticipated the impact of technology on 
the structure of human societies over two millennia 
ago. Information and communication technologies 
(icts) seem to have begun to turn his predictions into 
reality: “For if  every instrument could accomplish 
its own work, obeying or anticipating the will of 
others, like the statues of Daedalus, or the tripods 
of Hephaestus, which, says the poet, ‘of their own 
accord entered the assembly of the Gods’; if, in like 
manner, the shuttle would weave and the plectrum 
touch the lyre without a hand to guide them, chief  
workmen would not want servants, nor masters slaves” 
(Aristotle, 2009, p. 15).7
The importance of technical progress and the 
way it ties in with the social structure is quite well 
summarized in this “prophetic” passage, which is 
particularly applicable to the current advent of icts.
The most direct connection between Aristotle’s 
epistemological outlook and that of the Latin American 
structuralist school is identified by Furtado himself  
as he delves into the depths of  Aristotle’s causal 
approach.
Furtado says: “The concepts of structure (form) 
and process (causality) are fundamental ingredients in 
cognitive work. Our view of the world is underpinned 
by them. The structural approach reduces the 
cognitive horizon because it remains on the plane of 
morphological description and excludes the notion of 
causality. At the same time, the analytical approach leads 
to a localized determinism and conceals the qualitative 
aspect. Aristotle sought to integrate these two concepts 
using the principle of finality. The methodology of the 
social sciences has sought to attain this integration 
using the notion of  creativity, understood as the 
human faculty of interfering with causal determinism 
and enriching any social process with new elements. 
When some degree of preponderance is attained, or 
when the action of several of these elements converges, 
innovative acts lead to structural discontinuity. The 
innovative faculty (creativity), for which there is ample 
evidence on the sociological plane, thus acquires a 
status on the logical plane” (Furtado, 1978).
It is worth clarifying the links between this 
paragraph of Furtado’s and the famous four causes 
(or four explanations) of Aristotelian epistemology to 
which it implicitly refers. For Aristotle, what Furtado 
calls structure is associated with the idea of form or 
formal cause. In turn, the notion of process, as used 
by contemporary science in the realm of  physics 
and nature, corresponds to the concept of efficient 
cause understood as the dynamic that generates and 
transforms structure. According to Furtado, when 
this process takes place in the social sphere and also 
entails a structural change (a “trans-formation” or 
modification of the Aristotelian form), its origin is to 
be sought in human creativity. The idea of creativity 
conclusions and the second to voluntaristic ones, 
but neither of the two exhausts the scope for analysis 
of a social system. Consequently, in an exhaustive 
application of the systemic view of human societies 
it is necessary to pass from the actors to the power 
structure and then from the power structure to the 
actors (Bunge, 1998).
This systemic incorporation of the concept of 
power into explanations of  market mechanisms is 
reminiscent of the conditions Thomas Kuhn (1969) sees 
as necessary for the structure of scientific revolutions 
when new, emerging theories expand the worldview 
of existing theories and incorporate them into a new 
explanatory paradigm.
IV
Philosophical underpinnings of the structuralist 
outlook: creativity, development and power
7 Daedalus was a legendary artist, architect and inventor. Haephestus 
was the blacksmith and craftsman god par excellence, creating 
extraordinary work such as Achilles’ shield. The tripods he made 
ran on self-propelling wheels.
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tied to human freedom here replaces the idea of final 
cause which was fundamental to Aristotle’s teleology. 
Again, what Furtado terms an analytical approach 
leading to a localized determinism concerns the 
components of  the structure, considered statically 
and in isolation, and comes close to the analysis 
and decomposition of matter (the material cause, in 
Aristotelian language). However, this concept does 
allow for change, understood as a transition from 
potential (what the material can become) to the act 
(when the material becomes in reality what it only 
was potentially), while localized determinism does 
not necessarily incorporate this dynamic outlook 
(Bunge, 1961, pp. 44 and 45).
The static notion of  equality of  conditions 
(ceteribus paribus) characteristic of  the method of 
neoclassical microeconomics, which still dominates 
Western economic thinking, is one of  the most 
prototypical examples of  the analytical approach 
leading to the localized determinism to which 
Furtado critically refers. These considerations serve 
to highlight the limiting, one-dimensional character 
of this analytical perspective.
Furtado’s concept of  creativity chimes with 
the “Aristotelian prophesy” that, if  the progress of 
technology allowed it, “the shuttle would weave and the 
plectrum touch the lyre without a hand to guide them, 
chief workmen would not want servants, nor masters 
slaves”. Without a doubt, technical progress, which 
Furtado sees as one of the two ways whereby human 
creativity is realized, has been the great transformer 
of the causal process underpinning social structures 
and has gradually been approaching (now more than 
ever with icts) that vision formulated over 2,000 years 
ago by the illustrious Greek philosopher.
The relationship established by Furtado between 
the concepts of  creativity and development is 
summarized in the following words: “In its twofold 
aspect as a force that generates a new surplus and an 
impulse that creates new cultural values, this process, 
by liberating human energies, constitutes the ultimate 
source of what we understand by development. The 
marvellous array of cultures that have arisen upon 
the earth bears witness to the astonishing inventive 
potential of mankind. If we know anything about the 
process of cultural creativity, it is precisely that man’s 
potential is bottomless” (Furtado, 1978, my italics).
Thus, Furtado goes back to Aristotle to introduce 
his own philosophical concept of creativity, in which 
the Aristotelian “final cause” is no longer dictated 
by the nature of things but by the (creative) use of 
human freedom. In other words, technical progress 
as it operates in today’s world is the great dynamizer 
of capitalist societies. For better or for worse, it is 
also a phenomenon whose ultimate cultural roots lie 
within Western civilization.
The most important feature of this creative process 
is the ability to confer power upon those who control 
it scientifically, in the contemporary sense of the word 
“science” as derived from the tradition established by 
Galileo, Newton and Bacon, among others.
Furtado goes on: “The intention signalled by 
Marx in one of  his theses about Feuerbach – the 
philosophers have interpreted the world, now the 
time has come to transform it – has been abundantly 
accomplished. The demarcation line between what is 
and is not science, in Popper’s happy expression, is laid 
down by the testing to which theories are subjected. 
Knowledge has tended increasingly to be of  the 
type that enhances our ability to foresee, to act. The 
fabulous wealth of resources now invested in science 
and its applications is justified by that effectiveness. 
And the central goal of this is, hélas, military power 
and accumulation” (Furtado, 1978).
This linkage between cultural power, technological 
power, military power and economic power is the 
foundation of  the centre-periphery outlook of 
structuralist economic theory as applied to the 
evolution of  the capitalist system and its specific 
peripheral characteristics.
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The concept of a system, on the one hand, and the idea 
of power, on the other, form part of the theoretical 
approach to development that gave rise to Latin 
American structuralism and underlie its theoretical 
understanding of  economic value, prices and the 
market. While this systemic language and the idea 
of  power it incorporates are present, implicitly or 
explicitly, in all the formulations of this school, it is 
brought out more clearly in certain studies (Furtado, 
1965; Pinto, 1968; Sunkel, 1970; Sunkel and Paz, 1970; 
Prebisch, 1981; Di Filippo, 1981a).
This systemic approach went beyond the bounds 
of economic theory and required a multidimensional 
study that could link strictly economic issues with those 
pertaining to other areas of human society, such as 
sociocultural, political and environmental considerations 
(Bunge, 1997 and 1998; Di Filippo, 2007).
Latin American structuralist theory highlights the 
importance of changes in technical rules embodied in 
instruments and personified in human qualifications. 
Structuralism takes as its subject not the average 
technical conditions in a given period but rather 
the local and international institutional effects of 
technological change imported from the centre.
The technical rules operating in today’s economy 
allow human beings and their organizations to relate 
to the instruments of consumption and production 
through specific qualifications that form part of the 
cultural sphere, while current social rules link human 
beings and their organizations with one another 
through transactions effected from institutionalized 
positions of power.
The idea of  structures essentially concerns 
the stability of  the technical or institutional rules 
internalized by actors (be they individuals or 
organizations), while the idea of structural change is 
historically dynamic and refers to the modification 
of rules or their internalization.
The issue of  technology is more difficult for 
structuralists8 than for the institutionalists of  the 
developed world, since technological change was not 
generated internally in Latin America but came from 
the centre along with the institutions and organizations 
imported as a result of it. When these external effects 
are reformulated or reconfigured, the result is specific 
heterogeneities, dependencies and vulnerabilities that are 
the central theme of structuralist economic theory.
After the end of  the Second World War, the 
reconstruction of Europe and the decolonization process, 
a debate about the nature and causes of development 
and underdevelopment began. Major contributions 
were then made in the field of development economics, 
including Latin American structuralism.9
The centre-periphery outlook of  structuralist 
theory combined two interwoven systemic outlooks: 
that of the international economic system and that 
of national economic systems. By emphasizing the 
asymmetrical character of technical progress arriving 
from the centre and the concentrated distribution of its 
benefits, it opened up a field of theory whose analyses 
centred on the concepts of system and asymmetrical 
positions of power.
V
The epistemological foundations of
Latin American structuralist economics
process is systemic in character. The answer might be that its focus 
of interest is on historical change in structures within systems like 
capitalism and democracy that are transhistorical in nature. The 
economic development process studied by this school is the dynamic 
of global capitalism and the type of interdependent interactions that 
take place between two economic subsystems: central capitalism 
and peripheral capitalism.
9 Ragnar Nurkse, Rosenstein Rodan, Gunnar Myrdal and 
Arthur Lewis, among others, did important work as interpreters 
of development and underdevelopment. Other scholars such as 
Simón Kuznets, Colin Clark, Wasily Leontief and Hollis Chenery 
contributed sound methodologies and empirical foundations to 
the approaches mentioned. Many of these authors influenced, or 
interacted with, the founders of the Latin American structuralist 
tradition. These lines of inquiry should strictly be termed economic 
theories of development and underdevelopment, and one of them 
is the Latin American school of development based on the seminal 
contribution of Latin American structuralism. Most of the major 
contributions of these thinkers, such as the idea of forwards and 
backwards production linkages and cumulative circular causes, 
have little in common with the idea of perfect competition and 
the supposed tendency for the market to self-regulate towards 
positions of  stable equilibrium. As will be seen later, so-called 
economic growth theory, particularly in its neoclassical form, has 
been gradually distancing itself  from the original overarching 
theoretical interpretations of development economics. See Nixson 
(2006), among others.
8 It may be asked why this school should be called “structuralist” 
and not “systemist”, given that its overall reading of the social 
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The structuralist theory of  development and 
underdevelopment is more comprehensible and 
empirically more fruitful because it uses an intersectoral 
relationship approach, something that has been 
contributed to, from different theoretical standpoints, 
by authors of the stature of Marx, Sraffa, Leontief, 
Chenery and Passineti, among others.
With the vogue of neoclassical growth theories 
(see box 2), the subject of intersectoral relationships 
was abandoned just when the influence of Keynesian 
economics was weakening (Los, 2001).10
The systemic approach in economics, clearly 
adopted by Latin American structuralism in its 1960s 
and 1970s versions, led to formalizations based on 
matrix algebra and on the definition of structural11 
input-output relationships and coefficients. These 
conceptual tools were vital for the eclac contribution 
to the study of  national accounts and for Latin 
American growth projections (Balboa, 1961). The 
first elementary economics manual prepared by the 
institution and the Latin American Institute for 
Economic and Social Planning (ilpes) to provide 
Latin American students with a structuralism-oriented 
training was also based on a systemic reading of 
the economic process that gave pride of  place to 
qualitative and institutional analysis of intersectoral 
relationships (Castro and Lessa, 1973). In this way, 
conceptual and theoretical frameworks that were 
systemic in character prepared the ground for the 
study of structural change required to understand 
development and underdevelopment processes.
In a broader and more abstract sense, the first text 
prepared at eclac and ilpes on underdevelopment in 
Latin America and development theory also adopted 
a clearly systemic approach to the subject (Sunkel 
and Paz, 1970). A system can be represented, whether 
quantitatively or qualitatively, in matricial language. 
In the matrix of a system it is possible to distinguish 
the actors who dynamize it, the structures that define 
it, the spheres or spaces occupied by the system (with 
an “inside” and an “outside”) and the mechanisms 
used by actors to implement their strategies within 
the framework of these structures.
In particular, matricial input-output language can 
be used to establish a consistent and fluid relationship 
between Keynesian effective demand theory and the 
study of  structures specific to underdeveloped or 
peripheral regions, as well as the structuralist theory 
of economic power positions implicit in the study of 
markets. In effect, the composition of aggregate demand, 
in both the short and the long run, depends on income 
distribution, which in turn depends on the positions of 
power (in production and institutions) of the contracting 
parties in factor, input and product markets. In Latin 
America, the concentrated distribution of exogenously 
generated technical progress translates into a situation 
of structural heterogeneity. In today’s global capitalism, 
the repositories of this technical progress are, to a large 
extent, transnational enterprises.
The input-output logic serves, by contrast with 
today’s neoclassical theory (see box 2), to highlight the 
fact that growth is “endogenous” to major firms, but 
not necessarily to small and medium-sized enterprises 
in the peripheral societies where they operate. The 
saving and investment process largely depends on 
major corporations, which may be from the centres or 
the peripheries themselves (Latin American business 
groups that have transnationalized, for example). In 
consequence, the accumulation process is overdependent 
on the microeconomic considerations arising from 
private-sector corporate planning interests.
In summary, the intersectoral analysis associated 
with matricial input-output logic can be used to describe 
and interpret the structural conditions of the Latin 
American economy. Unfortunately, matrices are hardly 
produced any longer in Latin America. Nonetheless, 
some efforts have been made to restore this approach 
(Infante and Sunkel, 2009).12
10 This agrees with a recent study that notes: “Since the mid-1980s, 
input-output (io) analyses have been excluded from the leading currents 
of economic thought. Periodical publications like Econometrica, 
Review of Economics and Statistics and Quarterly Journal of Economics 
ceased to publish io studies, while few leading economists seem to 
show any interest in progress within the field of io analysis.” In 
that essay, the author quoted explores the links between the idea 
of endogenous growth and structural change in a dynamic input-
output model (Los, 2001, introduction, paragraph 1).
11 We use the idea of structural coefficients rather than technical 
coefficients because matrices need to be expressed in units of value 
if  they are to provide a quantitative representation of an economic 
system. Chenery, quoting Klein, says: “A further question arises 
as to whether the input coefficients in the Leontief system should 
be interpreted as physical constants, as Leontief does, or as value 
ratios which combine the effects of both changes in relative prices 
and in quantities. Klein (1953, pp. 205-210) has suggested that the 
latter interpretation is more in keeping with economic theory and 
that there may be greater stability in value ratios than in physical 
input-output ratios, reflecting an elasticity of substitution between 
inputs close to unity” (Chenery and Clark, 1959). This idea agrees 
with the hypothesis of the present paper that prices express positions 
of power, in respect both of production (with a technological basis) 
and institutions (markets where there is monopolistic competition, 
for example).
12 “The heterogeneity of the Chilean economy is clearly revealed 
when we examine the different productivity levels of the various 
production strata, the types of intersectoral relationships, the value 
added generated and primary income distribution, together with 
the contribution of each production stratum to the dynamic of the 
economic structure” (Infante and Sunkel, 2009, p. 137).
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Anthropologists and economists have used the concept 
of surplus to interpret changes of historical epoch. 
The transition from primitive societies to the earliest 
urban civilizations of the ancient world was due to 
the introduction of  agricultural technologies that 
created a food surplus.
Marx’s concept of the development of productive 
forces highlights the critical importance of the successive 
technological revolutions and the appropriation of 
surpluses by the dominant social classes that have 
accompanied the growth of civilization. His historical 
idea of surplus differs, however, from his theoretical 
idea of surplus value.
In his theory of value, Marx freezes the historical 
notion of productive forces and surplus and formulates 
the idea of surplus value associated with the labour 
theory of value and his law of value, under conditions 
of stable equilibrium within a particular period. This 
idea of surplus, as applied to the capitalist system, 
could be termed the exploitation surplus if  measured 
in abstract units of labour (surplus value) or, more 
neutrally, distribution surplus  when measured in units 
of general purchasing power (i.e., nominal income 
flows divided by the price index for a subsistence 
consumption basket). The distribution surplus 
concept coincides with the structuralist approach, 
but structural heterogeneity (a characteristic feature 
of Latin American underdevelopment) invalidates the 
idea of average technical conditions on which Marx’s 
theory is based.
Rather than centring their theories of  value on 
a particular structural situation defined by average 
technical conditions, structuralists are concerned 
with the structural change associated with the 
development process. This notion of  surplus due to 
structural change could be termed the innovation 
surplus or development surplus and is a direct 
product of  human creativity in the sense proposed 
in the previous section. Economists generally use the 
term “productivity gains”, while Prebisch spoke of 
the fruits of  technical progress.
In Marx, the exploitation surplus (surplus value) 
assumes that productive forces have reached a given 
level of development and describes an appropriation 
mechanism compatible with his labour theory of value. 
Conversely, the innovation or development surplus 
idea formulated by the structuralists naturally assumes 
positions of power or dominance that are precisely 
the “social substance” measured by prices, but they 
conceive this surplus as the historical expression 
of  productive forces in action. This is a new flow, 
measured in units of historical time, that is added to 
the distribution surplus already accumulated.
An innovation surplus arises from the distribution 
of productivity gains between the labour force that 
helped to generate it and the other agents in the 
production process. This distribution of productivity 
gains or the fruits of  technical progress is one of 
the distributive struggles inherent in the dynamic of 
capitalism, whether peripheral or central.
The innovation surplus is measured on a 
macroeconomic scale and requires a calculation in 
units of power (general purchasing power) both of 
productivity gains and of their social distribution. 
This raises methodological and econometric challenges 
that have been neglected by structuralist economists, 
who are more comfortable with theoretical reflection 
than detailed measurement. There is no room in this 
paper to speculate about the primary appropriation 
mechanisms whereby this surplus accrues to firms, in 
a macroeconomic process that was studied both by 
Furtado (1964) and by Prebisch (1981, pp. 107-124), so 
we have confined ourselves to describing the essential 
substance of the concept in its structuralist version.
VI
The concept of surplus in structuralist
economic theory
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The concept of power is omnipresent in structuralist 
theories of development. Reflecting on the links between 
the idea of  the nation State and the structuralist 
conception of development, Sunkel is unequivocal: “At 
the same time, this way of understanding development 
lays the stress on action, on the instruments of 
political power and on power structures themselves; 
and it is these, ultimately, that explain the orientation, 
effectiveness, strength and nature of the internal and 
external social manipulation of culture, productive 
resources, technology and socio-political groups” 
(Sunkel and Paz, 1970, p. 38).
The political power of the State sets the ground 
rules for all power structures in every area. Consequently, 
the concept of institutionalized power is not just a 
matter for political science to study. The ground rules 
of the political system also determine the political, 
economic, cultural and even biologico-environmental 
power positions of  individuals. From a systemic 
standpoint, furthermore, the intrinsic mechanism 
of  the exercise of  power includes another two 
interrelated concepts: human needs and situations 
of dependency.
The concepts of need and dependency are not 
understood in a purely economic sense either, but are 
approached in a multidimensional fashion. Situations 
of  need and dependency can also be encountered 
in political, cultural and biologico-environmental 
subsystems.
We suggest that at the heart of the structuralist 
concept of a distribution surplus, in relation to a given 
structural situation, stand the relationships between 
needs, situations of  dependency and positions of 
power. To capture these and their distributive effects 
it is necessary to study the specific mechanisms of 
historically existing markets, and this examination 
cannot be confined to the production structure. An 
illustrious philosophical precedent for this conceptual 
linkage can be sought in the Aristotelian idea that 
the interdependence of human needs is the essential 
bond of  social life and the basis for all economic 
transactions, which require money as a measure of 
the terms of trade. In turn, Aristotle conceives of 
money not in relation to its form as merchandise (gold, 
silver, etc.) but directly as an institutional expression 
deriving from the existence of political society (polis or 
State). Thus, the Aristotelian approach to economics 
is clearly institutional.13
The rate of surplus value and the Marxist concept 
of exploitation have no direct relationship to the scale 
of the needs experienced by people or their degree of 
dependency upon those who hold economic power 
(owners of  the power of  production). Thus, in an 
automated firm with the highest level of productivity, 
the rate of surplus value (in Marx’s sense) “extracted” 
from a highly qualified engineer may be very great. 
However, this “exploitation” will be compatible 
with an excellent standard of living for him and his 
family and an institutional context that allows him to 
terminate his contractual relationship without serious 
consequences. Alternatively, the rate of surplus value 
for an illiterate peasant may be much lower in terms 
of abstract working time, but could entail a situation 
of  extreme need and dependency in a context of 
structured domination mechanisms.
In his book Criatividade e dependência, Furtado 
makes the following point: “Market operations are, as 
a rule, transactions between agents of unequal power. 
In effect, the reason why trade – an expression of the 
division of labour – exists in the first place is to create 
a surplus, the appropriation of which is not based on 
any natural law. The ‘imperfect’ markets discussed 
by economists are nothing more than a euphemism 
to describe the ex post result of the imposition of the 
will of particular agents upon this appropriation. Since 
VII
The concepts of power and surplus
in the dynamic of the market 
13 This claim is reinforced if  we remember that for Aristotle virtues 
are habits of behaviour and that human needs arise on a daily or 
periodic basis, requiring habits of individual and social behaviour 
(operative institutions) conducive to their satisfaction. “There 
must, therefore, be (as was said above) one standard by which 
all commodities are measured. This standard is in fact demand, 
which holds everything together (for if  people had no needs, or 
needs on a different scale, there could be no exchange, or else 
it must be on different lines); but by a convention demand has 
come to be represented by money. This is why money (nomisma) 
is so called, because it exists not by nature but by custom, and it 
is in our power to change its value or render it useless” (Aristotle, 
2003, pp. 125-126).
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all markets are ‘imperfect’ in one way or another, 
trading activities will necessarily engender a process 
of concentration of wealth and power, whence the 
structural tendency, observed from the beginnings 
of industrial capitalism, towards the formation of 
large enterprises. Many observers will wrongly infer 
from this that small firms tend to disappear, but 
experience shows that they are irreplaceable in the 
exercise of important functions: without small firms, 
the capitalist system would be very much the loser, in 
terms not only of flexibility but also of enterprise and 
inventiveness” (Furtado, 1978, my italics).
Conveniently for a short essay like this one, the 
above paragraph provides a useful summary of two very 
important ideas in the development-underdevelopment 
diagnosis implicit in structuralist thinking. The first is 
that of the distribution surplus, as distinct from the idea 
of the innovation surplus (which is not considered here), 
and the second is the issue of structural heterogeneity 
in economic systems, which acquires critical importance 
in peripheral forms of capitalism.
Let us examine the situation of a small firm that 
coexists and competes with a large one. This obviously 
implies the presence of profoundly asymmetrical market 
structures, which predominate in most economic 
sectors. It also implies a technological heterogeneity 
that is obscured to some degree both by the concept 
of  average technical conditions in a given period, 
assumed in Marx’s theory of value, and by the idea of 
marginal labour productivity in neoclassical production 
and distribution theory.
The role played by the small firm, apart from its 
characteristics of flexibility, initiative and inventiveness, 
is to help determine the total distribution surplus, 
macroeconomically considered. By setting an upper 
limit for the minimum wage, in consequence of their 
lower productivity (both mean and marginal), small 
firms enhance the profits of the large firms they coexist 
with, since these can afford far higher wages than are 
paid to low-skilled workers in small firms. In inflationary 
situations, furthermore, when workers demand an increase 
in the purchasing power of their pay, small firms are not 
productive and financially sound enough to raise wages 
so that, without meaning to, they “hold back” a majority 
of less skilled and unionized workers by capping their 
pay. All this is conducive not only to the growth of the 
distribution surplus vis-à-vis social output, but also to 
the tendency for it to accumulate in higher-productivity 
firms controlled by high-income groups. This happens 
in the form both of profits for large, often transnational 
firms and of high and rising pay for skilled workers in 
technical and managerial positions.
When markets are allowed to follow their own 
dynamic, the result, in both the centre and the periphery, 
is an intensification of structural heterogeneity (Pinto, 
1965; Pinto and Di Filippo, 1991a and 1991b; Di 
Filippo, 1981a and 1981b) and income concentration. 
The average wage in small firms is therefore a 
subsistence line from which the pay of lower-skilled 
workers is calculated. Thus it is that the concept of 
needs is linked to that of surplus through the idea of 
institutionalized power.
VIII
Centre-periphery: the transhistorical approach 
and specific historical periods
The centre-periphery outlook, which is the characteristic 
framework of the historical and structural approach, 
has always been the starting point for Latin American 
structuralist economics. The power of  hegemonic 
centres over peripheral societies in the world order 
is ultimately based on control of the scientific and 
technological processes that ensure their predominance 
in the cultural, economic and politico-military spheres. 
We have already examined the abstract links between 
culture (science and technology), creativity and power 
that have characterized the evolution of  Western 
civilization. The point that needs to be emphasized, as 
it is essential for an understanding of the key features 
of structuralist economic theory, is that Latin American 
societies have always been recipients of the waves of 
technological change that have reached the continent 
since the days of conquest and colonization.
The “intangible power” (Ferrer, 1996, p. 14) of 
the centre’s scientific and technological knowledge 
is the starting point for understanding the historical 
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formation of Latin American societies. The phases in 
which the centre-periphery outlook became established 
were determined by the successive waves of technology 
that swept these societies. What concerns us here is the 
time these events began in Latin America rather than 
the time the technological revolutions were actually 
happening in the centre itself.
The first wave of technology (fifteenth century) 
came from the Iberian powers, which used their 
knowledge of navigation, warlike equipment (armour, 
mounts, firearms), production processes (mining and 
farming techniques) and instruments of consumption 
and production to transform the basis of pre-Hispanic 
society. The second wave (nineteenth century) arrived 
after the British Industrial Revolution, when the 
emerging international capitalism established itself in 
the coal, iron, steel and steamship and railway industries 
just as the Latin American countries were becoming 
politically independent. The third (twentieth century) 
derived from the second industrial revolution in the 
United States, which led to increasing use of energy 
from oil and, to a lesser extent, from electricity, along 
with procedures for rationalizing work (Taylorism, 
Fordism, etc.) and new durable products such as the 
automobile and household electrical appliances. The 
fourth and most recent (twenty-first century), which had 
already begun by the late twentieth century, has been 
the introduction of information and communication 
technologies and advances in biotechnology. Its 
consequences have given rise to a new era which we 
call global, or globalized.
While what Aldo Ferrer says is broadly accurate 
and the history of  globalization began during the 
conquest and colonization of America, the current 
technological revolution has transnationalized 
production in new ways that have given a leading 
role to transnational enterprises and are requiring 
a transformation of  domestic institutions, while 
structurally affecting the basis of the centre-periphery 
relationship (Sunkel, 1970; Di Filippo, 1998).
IX
Centre-periphery, economic value
and the terms of trade
Structuralist theories of economic value try to find the 
links between structural change, both technological 
and institutional, and the dynamic of prices. This is 
a feature both of global markets and of the societies 
of the periphery themselves.
Prebisch’s version of the deteriorating terms of 
trade theory, formulated in the late 1940s and early 
1950s, illustrates this structural dynamic. Prebisch 
was not interested in equilibrium prices at a given 
point in time, but concerned himself  with certain 
specific international markets (commodities versus 
manufactures), subjecting them to a sustained 
examination of the terms of trade deriving from the 
international division of labour between centre and 
periphery. The conditions in which this deterioration 
took place were dynamic and structural (technological 
and institutional).
The income elasticity of  demand is only the 
empirical expression of an explanation whose structural 
basis lies deeper. According to Engel’s laws, in the 
sphere of  consumption the elasticity of  demand 
increases more quickly for manufactures than for 
primary commodities. The study of  these baskets 
of goods provides, furthermore, an empirical basis 
for the idea of basic needs and for the poverty line 
from which subsistence wages can be calculated to 
provide a reference framework for establishing the 
needs-dependency-power nexus on which the concept 
of surplus is based.
The cyclical character of capitalist development 
in the centre determines the instability of prices for 
both manufactures and commodities. Empirical 
measurements immediately show that commodity 
prices are far more variable than those of manufactures 
and that, in the long run, global demand for the latter 
(inputs or final products) grows more quickly than 
demand for commodities.
This tendency lies at the root of the chronic debts 
and deficits weighing on the external accounts of Latin 
America. The last cyclical boom associated with the 
rise of commodity-consuming emerging economies, 
most of them in Asia, seemed to indicate that it had 
been reversed as these economies decoupled from 
the cycles of  the developed world. At the present 
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juncture, however, the deep recession affecting the 
Western centres has also hit the Asian countries hard 
and commodity prices have dropped back from levels 
that were unprecedentedly high by the standards of 
earlier cycles. Time will tell how global commodity 
prices evolve in the longer run.
From the standpoint of the international supply 
of both commodities and manufactures, meanwhile, 
the terms-of-trade deterioration appears to be due to 
positions of institutionalized power. Prebisch notes 
that the expansion of productive power (productivity 
gains) is not appropriated to any significant extent in 
the periphery, because workers lack the cultural and 
political influence and union power needed to ensure 
that their incomes keep pace with the improvement. 
Conversely, wage earners in the central societies, 
particularly since the end of the Second World War, 
hold positions of institutionalized power (unionization, 
political participation) that enable them to increase 
their incomes in line with their productivity. In this 
sphere too the historical conditions of the terms of 
trade are changing because of the participation of 
emerging Asia. There, large productivity gains in 
manufacturing are being transferred to transnational 
enterprises operating in export processing zones even 
as they create unfavourable terms of trade for Asian 
societies, since their political and social systems, 
especially in China, do not provide the conditions 
for pay to keep pace with these gains.
In any event, alterations in historical conditions 
and empirical trends do not mean the theory is faulty, 
but are a consequence of new structural conditions in 
the societies participating in the global marketplace. 
The explanation for the deterioration in the terms 
of trade for commodities as against manufactures 
forms part of a theory of economic value according 
to which the power positions of contracting parties in 
the production and social structure, and the changes 
in these positions, determine fluctuations in relative 
prices for these goods.
X
The structuralist theory of inflation
Latin American structuralism does not study the general 
equilibrium conditions of markets, but rather the long-
term structural forces that are constantly destabilizing 
them in the dynamic of economic development. Nor 
does it see the market as possessing self-regulatory 
forces that return it to positions of stable equilibrium. A 
practical application of this outlook was provided by the 
formulation of the structuralist theory of inflation.
Structuralism studied inflation in the light of 
the factors tending to unbalance sectoral or specific 
markets as a result of  the structural changes that 
accompanied the economic development process in 
the post-war period and approximately up to the end 
of the 1970s. On the one hand, this examination had 
an international focus, in accordance with the centre-
periphery view of the cyclical oscillations caused in 
the central economies by changes in the quantity and 
prices of tradable goods, giving rise to situations of 
external imbalance or alterations in the terms of trade 
(Prebisch, 1963, appendix).
In the national economies of  the periphery, 
inflation was caused by a combination of external 
constraints and domestic supply bottlenecks caused by 
institutional or industrial rigidities. In all cases, relative 
price changes were the immediate driving force behind 
inflation and its effects on absolute prices.
Between the late 1950s and early 1960s, a number 
of Latin American authors proposed and developed 
an interpretation of inflation that helped to justify and 
consolidate the appellation of “structuralist” by which 
this school of theory has been known (Noyola, 1957; 
Sunkel, 1958; Prebisch, 1963 and 1981; Pinto, 1968).
Particularly with regard to inflation, the distinction 
between structure and system was highlighted. Assuming 
the existence and historical continuity of the latter, 
what can change or stay the same is its structure. In 
this context, it is not only the structure that needs to 
be considered but also the actors operating within it 
and the system mechanisms, understood as processes 
driven by these actors either to preserve its existing 
workings or in an attempt to change them. Given 
the preoccupation of Latin American structuralist 
economics with development, structural change is a 
matter of fundamental interest to it.
Setting out from the systemic approach of which 
structuralist economics may be considered part, it is 
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possible to identify the structural heterogeneity of 
economic systems, the actors occupying leading positions 
of power within them, the areas of operation of the 
system and the institutionalized power mechanisms 
whereby these actors affect and are affected by 
inflationary processes.
The pioneers of  the structuralist approach to 
inflation were, without question, Noyola (1957) and 
Sunkel (1958). Noyola established a fertile conceptual 
distinction between basic (structural) inflationary 
pressures and the propagation mechanisms operated 
by structurally conditioned actors.
Sunkel, for his part, distinguished between basic, 
circumstantial and cumulative inflationary pressures. 
The first of these include structural rigidities that not 
only affect costs associated with factor endowments 
and the production structure, but also positions of 
institutionalized power (agricultural property rights, 
for example, or import capacity) that conflict with 
the new dynamic demands of  development. The 
idea of circumstantial inflationary pressures allows 
for consideration of  specific historical situations 
(environmental issues, wars, etc.) that are unpredictable 
and affect structures sporadically. Lastly, the concept 
of cumulative inflationary pressures assumes that, since 
inflation is obviously a structural disequilibrium, it is 
not necessarily corrected by the free play of market 
forces or through restriction of the money supply, 
but can give rise to cumulative circular tendencies 
(Myrdal, 1967) that maintain or exacerbate the 
original imbalances.
In turn, the propagation mechanisms identified by 
Sunkel may be interpreted as the concrete forms taken 
on by the distributive struggle between the different 
agents affected by the inflationary process, depending 
on their positions of institutionalized power and their 
specific action strategies. Pressures of this type are 
manifested when the different social groups try to 
recover their positions in the income distribution.
Subsequently, building upon the foundational 
contributions of Noyola and Sunkel, Pinto (1968) and 
Prebisch (1981) directly and forthrightly introduced 
the social structure concept to explain the positions 
of institutionalized power underlying the relative price 
changes that translate, synthetically, into inflation.
In his last book, Prebisch (1981) also made an effort 
to tie in structuralist “social” inflation theory with a 
theory of power and surplus, in which the inflationary 
mechanism was associated with the distributive struggle 
through the logic of peripheral capitalism. According 
to Prebisch, this mechanism militated against the 
development of peripheral democracy. Leaving aside the 
actual merits or demerits of his arguments, which there 
is no room to discuss in this paper, what Prebisch was 
expressing once again was a theory of economic value 
that explained the dynamic of prices and the market 
with reference to the positions of institutionalized 
power held by actors in the social structure.
XI
values, markets and prices in the
twenty-first century
The structuralist approach always gave central 
importance to the level and distribution of  real 
income as a determining factor in the behaviour of 
the effective demand that drives the economic system. 
Today’s globalization process has altered both the 
causes and the effects of income distribution.
Structuralism rejects the idea of functional income 
distribution in the neoclassical sense of remuneration 
for the factors of production expressing their marginal 
productivity as calculated on the assumption of perfect 
competition in the markets concerned. In fact, the 
ownership structure of the factors of production and 
the markets where these are traded largely reflects the 
network of other institutions that regulate the positions 
of  cultural, political and biologico-environmental 
power of the individuals and families who control 
the factors of production.
Underlying the distribution of income has always 
been the structure of  ownership of  the strategic 
resources, both real and financial, traded in markets. 
In fact, the analysis of social classes carried out by 
the classical economists and Marx was based on the 
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position occupied in that structure by landowners, 
peasants, financiers, industrialists and workers, among 
other segments of society.
In today’s globalized world, this basic, transhistorical 
observation acquires specific characteristics. The real 
resources whose prices are largely determined by their 
ownership include what are known as natural resources 
(cultivable land, woodland, springs, ecosystems, mineral 
wealth, non-renewable energy sources), the supply of 
which is increasingly dependent on environmental and 
technological factors. Furthermore, the ownership of 
“human capital” based on education has also come to 
form part of the privatization of knowledge associated 
with the stratification of labour markets. This factor 
has increased the importance of cultural power in the 
functioning of markets and prices. Meanwhile, political 
power is manifested in new ground rules that are 
increasingly “transnationalizing” property rights.
The key players in this new era are transnational 
enterprises and their ownership rights (which we 
might perhaps term “transnational rights” owing to 
the ease with which they are transferred through stock 
market mechanisms), the direct access they have to 
global financial capital and their control of leading-
edge technologies developed in their own research 
and development departments, which allow them to 
further enhance their productivity gains.
Many of  these transnationals’ productivity 
gains are generated in their subsidiaries in peripheral 
societies (Di Filippo, 1998). Their ability to capture 
economic surplus derives precisely from the fact 
that they achieve “central” productivity levels with 
“peripheral” wages.
In the modern era, the centre-periphery idea as 
it relates to the global power structure has become 
associated with the mechanisms for creating and 
controlling technological power. This “intangible 
power” (Ferrer, 1996, p. 14) is generated in politically 
unified national societies, as a product of their internal 
cultural dynamic.
The idea that the globalization process has made 
it possible for transnational enterprises to operate 
independently of the political and cultural power of 
their home countries is a mirage, firstly because the 
great technological revolutions are a cultural product of 
hegemonic countries, and secondly because these firms 
still require institutionalized ground rules to enable them 
to operate on a global scale. The investment, services, 
intellectual property and other codes approved by the 
World Trade Organization (wto) are all examples of 
such institutional frameworks.
For example, events such as the 1998 failure of 
negotiations over the adoption of the Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (mai) by the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (oecd) 
created an institutional vacuum that may have contributed 
to the current disastrous collapse (2009) of investment 
banks in the United States and its contagion to the rest 
of the world’s fragile financial architecture.
Indeed, the growth processes that have operated 
in Latin America since the 1990s are essentially a 
transplant of globally evolved market institutions that 
are not always compatible with the political institutions 
of  democracy. The frequent crises experienced in 
the last 20 years have been due to the absence of a 
“financial architecture” capable of  regulating the 
behaviour of major transnational actors.
In the first place, the need to have specific 
institutions that are adapted to transnational agents 
and markets and transcend the political and cultural 
frameworks of nation States has led to a proliferation 
of rules laying down quality standards not only in 
procedural, sanitary and environmental matters, 
such as the rules of the International Organization 
for Standardization (iso), but also in the political and 
economic spheres, as with the classification established 
by risk rating agencies such as Moody’s.
The quality standards required by international 
investors are set by intergovernmental agencies or 
globally active private organizations for every kind of 
issue: competitiveness, legal security, macroeconomic 
policy stability, etc. Although such standards are 
reasonable given the need to compete in a globalized 
world, there has always been a case for questioning 
standardized prescriptions that do not take account 
of national or regional peculiarities.
With regard to the resolution of disputes between 
global investors and governmental authorities, both 
multilateral and regional agreements often contain 
clauses giving jurisdiction over these to panels of 
experts who pronounce on environmental, sanitary 
and even employment matters, overriding national 
and local standards (Di Filippo, 2008).
In the sphere of  technology and production, 
there can be no denying that these standards are 
underpinned by the tremendous effectiveness of the 
pragmatic methods of Western science in the terms 
analysed by Furtado and examined in earlier sections. 
These form part of the “intangible power” projected 
by the great universities of the developed world, and 
upon them the technological future of  humanity 
instrumentally depends.
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However, an attempt is being made to transfer 
similar “objective” standards to the economic, social 
and political sphere, confusing neoliberal market 
dogmas with the theoretical foundations of economics, 
politics and culture.
Education is tending to become, wholly or in 
part, a commodity. The same is happening with other 
public goods such as security (segregated residential 
neighbourhoods) and the administration of justice (the 
high cost of legal advice), along with the privatization 
of parks, beaches, motorways and even citizen security. 
The characteristic ground rules of the growth style 
that is part and parcel of global capitalism have been 
introduced in all political, economic and cultural 
institutions, fixing new positions of institutionalized 
power that have ultimately affected the distribution 
of  personal and family income, the geographical 
location of the social classes and strata in different 
areas of great metropolises and the distribution of 
educational opportunities in these same areas, among 
other things.
As a consequence of these shifts, markets and 
prices have undergone profound structural alterations, 
principally in response to changes in the institutions that 
regulate the supply and cost of the primary production 
factors (labour and natural resources) and money.
XII
The global financial crisis
of the neoliberal order
In a systemic analysis of the current global economic 
order, it is possible to establish a difference between 
actors, technical and social structures, spheres or spaces 
occupied by the system and processes or mechanisms 
employed by the actors that drive it. Here we shall 
examine the global economic system, distinguishing 
three main actors: (i) the hegemonic centres, basically 
the United States and the European Union, which 
since the post-war period have been the “makers” of 
international technical and social structures (rules), (ii) 
the intergovernmental negotiating and lending agencies 
that administer and propagate these ground rules and 
(iii) transnational corporations, which are the main 
beneficiaries of the new type of global transactions 
that have proliferated following the introduction of 
information and communication technologies.
Considered multidimensionally, of  course, 
the globalization process includes other important 
transnational actors, starting with the great monotheistic 
churches, transnational networks of universities and 
other cultural establishments and numerous non-
governmental organizations of  various types and 
orientations. To understand the current economic 
crisis of  the global order, however, even the most 
cursory review must make mention of at least the 
three actors mentioned.
The actors concerned interact within the 
framework of institutional structures monitored by 
multilateral agencies —the wto, the International 
Monetary Fund (imf), the World Bank— and 
technological structures peculiar to the current era 
of information and communications. The economic 
sphere in which the international system operates 
has expanded considerably following the inclusion 
of China, India and the countries of eastern Europe 
that were formerly members of  the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon). All these 
are developing strategies and tactics to increase their 
control over global markets. However, the pacesetters 
in the global era are transnational enterprises (Di 
Filippo, 1998).
After the failure of  the mai negotiations, 
transnational agents in the global system, United 
States investment banks in particular, fostered and 
benefited from the creation of successive speculative 
“bubbles”.
The predominant neoliberal outlook, rooted 
in an individualism that is not only methodological 
(the whole is the sum of its parts) but also ethical 
(executives with pay directly linked to firms’ short-
term earnings) opened the way to the creation of 
inadequately coordinated and supervised worldwide 
networks of transnational production and finance.
Up to a point, this neoliberal approach is also 
responsible for the huge financial crisis the world 
economy is experiencing now (2009), known colloquially 
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as the subprime crisis. This was at least partly due to 
credit creation by investment banks (money supply) that 
was driven by a private or sectoral rationale, without 
taking account of the institutionalized positions of 
power of the contracting parties.
Information technologies have facilitated the 
creation of “plastic money” (debit and credit cards) and 
the spread of consumer lending, providing individuals 
and families with liquidity against as yet unearned 
wages to purchase consumer durables. Lending of 
this type has recently been extended to all kinds of 
consumer goods, including the perishables bought 
on a daily basis in supermarkets. A gulf  accordingly 
began to open up between the liquidity or immediate 
purchasing power of borrowers and their solvency 
over different repayment periods.
Under conditions of  what we might call 
“consumerist overborrowing”, investment bank executives 
overestimated the solvency of mortgage borrowers and 
thus their ability to service the transactions they were 
carrying out. The ability of monetary policy (interest 
rates and money creation) to restore balance in the 
monetary and financial markets was also overestimated. 
The subject cannot be gone into here, but there can be 
no doubt that the monetary instrument, applied with 
a neoliberal mentality, has begun to fail.
Among other explanations for the financial collapse 
of global capitalism (2009), there is the fact that the 
monetary-financial sphere is not independent of the 
real economy and that money creation is not neutral, 
i.e., that it will create winners and losers depending on 
the structural power conditions under which it is carried 
out and the mechanisms used, acting through relative 
output prices and wealth to be reflected ultimately in 
activity levels and income distribution.
In the context of this unprecedented financial 
permissiveness, the “invisible hand” of the financial 
market was subjected to the microeconomic business 
model of the investment banks. Hyman Minsky (1992), 
whose strongly Keynesian thinking developed in 
the 1980s and is now in vogue because of the global 
crisis, considered three types of firms (financial and 
otherwise) from the standpoint of  their behaviour 
in credit markets: (i) hedge units, capable of paying 
down not just the interest but also the principal on 
their debts, (ii) speculative units, capable of paying 
interest but not principal and (iii) Ponzi units, whose 
profitability depends on “bubbles” or markets artificially 
driven up by speculative feedback.
According to Minsky, the first theorem of the 
financial instability hypothesis is that the economy 
has financing regimes under which it is stable and 
financing regimes in which it is unstable. The second 
theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that 
over periods of prolonged prosperity, the economy 
transits from financial relations that make for a stable 
system to financial relations that make for an unstable 
system (Minsky, 1992, pp. 8 and 9).
This behaviour of individual actors in the context 
of a financial system with regimes and institutions 
that are highly permissive and culturally legitimated 
on the basis of an individualistic neoliberal ethos has 
facilitated financial frauds based on “Ponzi models” 
such as the Madoff scandal, whose cost is put at US$ 
50 billion on initial estimates.
We cannot go further into the subject here, but the 
systemic examination that is part of the structuralist 
approach suggests that when the regulatory institutions, 
structures and regimes of global capitalism are relaxed, 
or their design depends on firms’ microeconomic 
rationality, transnational operators overstep their 
powers and responsibilities and try to maximize 
earnings to the “limit” of  what their positions of 
institutionalized power allow. This limit was exceeded 
in late 2008 and early 2009, leading to the collapse 
of the United States financial system and a global 
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